Delegating a Product of Group Exponentiations with Application to Signature Schemes

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Abstract. Group exponentiations are important primitive operations used in many public-key cryptosystems and, more generally, cryptographic protocols. To expand the applicability of these solutions to computationally weaker devices, it has been advocated that a computationally weaker client (i.e., capable of performing a relatively small number of modular multiplications) delegates such primitive operations to a computationally stronger server. Important requirements for such delegation protocols include maintaining the privacy of the client’s input exponent and security in the sense of detecting, except for very small probability, any malicious server’s attempt to convince the client of an incorrect exponentiation result. Only recently, a first protocol for the delegation of a fixed-based exponentiation, over a cyclic groups with certain properties, has been presented and proved to satisfy both requirements. In this paper we show that a product of many fixed-base exponentiations, over a cyclic groups with certain properties, can be privately and securely delegated by keeping the client’s online number of modular multiplications only slightly larger than in the delegation of a single exponentiation. We use this result to show the first delegations of entire cryptographic schemes: the well-known digital signature schemes by El-Gamal [25], Schnorr [37] and Okamoto [36] over the q-order subgroup in $\mathbb{Z}_p$, as well as their variants based on elliptic curves. Previous results could only be used to delegate single algorithms of cryptographic schemes.

Keywords: Secure Delegation, Modular Exponentiations, Discrete Logarithms, Cryptography, Group Theory, Elliptic Curves

1 Introduction

Server-aided cryptography is an active research direction addressing the problem of computationally weaker clients delegating cryptographic computations to
computationally powerful servers. Recently, this area is seeing an increased interest because of shifts in modern computation paradigms towards cloud computing, large-scale computations over big data, and computations with low-power devices, such as RFIDs.

The first formal model for outsourcing of cryptographic operations was introduced in [29], where the authors especially studied outsourcing of modular exponentiation, as this operation is a cornerstone of so many cryptographic schemes and protocols. In this model, we have a client, with an input $x$, who delegates to one or more servers the computation of a function $F$ on the client’s input, and the main desired requirements are:

1. **privacy**: only minimal or no information about $x$ should be revealed to the server(s);
2. **security**: the server(s) should not be able, except possibly with very small probability, to convince the client to accept a result different than $F(x)$; and
3. **efficiency**: the client’s computation time should be much smaller than computing $F(x)$ without delegating the computation.

Moreover, in all previous work in the area, relatively expensive offline computation can be performed and stored on the client’s device (say, at client deployment time), and the computational weakness of the client is really only restricted to the online phase. For instance, towards a delegated computation of modular exponentiation, it seems reasonable to assume that even computationally weaker devices are or will soon be able to perform (a not large number of) less expensive operations like modular multiplications (see recent advances in, for instance, [1], showing how to practically implement group multiplication, for a specific group, and a related public-key cryptosystem, using RFID tags). This computation gap between servers and clients is significant in that with currently recommended parameter settings a single exponentiation requires on average more than 2000 multiplications.

In [29], the authors studied delegation of modular exponentiation to 2 servers of which at most one was malicious, and to 1 server, who was honest on almost all inputs. Recently, in [20], we solved the open problem of delegating a single fixed-based exponentiation in cyclic groups to a single, possibly malicious, server.

**Our Contributions.** In this paper we show that a product of *many* fixed-base exponentiations, over a cyclic group with certain properties, can be privately and securely delegated to a single, possibly malicious, server, by keeping the client’s online number of modular multiplications only slightly larger than that for delegating a *single* exponentiation. Our result holds for a general class of cyclic groups with efficient operation and inverse, and efficiently verifiable proofs of membership. Although not all cyclic groups are known to satisfy these properties, we show that this class includes cyclic groups often used in cryptography (i.e., the prime order multiplicative subgroup of $\mathbb{Z}_p$, for primes $p$ of a special form, and the analogue additive group based on elliptic curves). Fixing the first of these two groups for efficiency evaluation, a product of $m$ exponentiations in $\mathbb{Z}_p$ with $\sigma$-bit exponents can be delegated by a client that only uses less than
2\lambda + 3m \text{ modular multiplications in the online phase, if detection of an incorrect result is bounded by probability } 2^{-\lambda}. \text{ This improves upon non-delegated computation, which would require up to } 2m\sigma \text{ modular multiplication (when exponentiation is performed via a square and multiply algorithm), as well as upon direct and repeated use of the delegation of a single exponentiation from [20], where the client would use up to } 2m\lambda + 4m \text{ modular multiplication in the online phase.}

We use this result to delegate the first cryptographic schemes: the well-known digital signature schemes by El-Gamal [25], Schnorr [37] and Okamoto [36] over the prime-order subgroup in \( \mathbb{Z}_p \), as well as their variants based on elliptic curves. Previously, only primitive operations like group exponentiations or inverses were delegated, and no complete cryptosystem was delegated to a single, possibly malicious, server. As an example of the efficiency achieved here, Okamoto’s scheme normally requiring a verification of 3 exponentiations with 2048-bit exponents can now be delegated by a client that can only uses, say, about 100 multiplications.

In the process, we formally define delegation of digital signature schemes, including changes to both the participant and the security model. First, we enrich the participant model of signature schemes (including a signer and a verifier) with a server who can assist both. Thus, both signer and verifier will be thought of as clients when interacting with the delegation server. Next, we generalize the standard unforgeability requirement to also hold in the presence of 2 additional classes of attacks introduced by the delegated computation paradigm: (1) eavesdropping of the communication between the server and the two clients (i.e., signer and the verifier), as well as (2) querying the server oracles, possibly done by the adversary after being able to perform a signer or verifier impersonation. We also provide a conversion theorem showing that a non-delegated signature scheme can be converted into a delegated signature scheme using a suitable delegation protocol for a desired primitive operation (e.g., single exponentiation, product of exponentiations, etc.). Establishing this result calls for the use of an alternative, simulation-based, definition of privacy in delegation protocols (many previous works targeted an indistinguishability-based definitions of privacy).

Related Work. The first formal model for secure delegation protocols was presented in [29]. There, a secure delegation protocol is formally defined as essentially a secure function evaluation [40] of the client’s function delegated to the server. Follow-up models from [27] and [12, 20] define separate requirements of correctness, (input) privacy and (result) security. There, the privacy requirement is defined in the sense of the adversary’s indistinguishability of two different inputs from the client, even after corrupting the server; and the security requirement is defined in the sense of the adversary’s inability to convince the client of an incorrect function output, even after corrupting the server. In our paper, we use a simulation-based definition of input privacy, which can be shown to imply the indistinguishability-based definition in [12, 20].

We can partition all other (single-server) secure delegation protocols we are aware of in 3 main classes, depending on whether they delegate (a) exponentia-
tion in a specific group; (b) other specific computations (e.g., linear algebra); or (c) an arbitrary polynomial-time function.

With respect to (a), protocols were proposed for a single exponentiation in specific groups related to discrete logarithm or factoring problems (see, e.g., [29, 13, 20] and references therein). These protocols delegate exponentiation in settings where the client is assumed to be powerful enough to run a not large number of group multiplications, but not enough to evaluate the delegated exponentiation function. There are also many protocols in the literature for the delegation of a single exponentiation, not targeting or achieving all our requirements (see, e.g., [14, 22, 39, 32]). In our model, protocols for the delegation of exponentiation in general groups were proposed in [12, 18], and protocols to delegate multiple exponentiations in specific groups were proposed in [19].

With respect to (b), protocols for linear algebra and/or scientific computation were proposed in, e.g., [33, 2, 8, 3, 26]. These protocols delegate various linear algebra operations in settings where the client is assumed to be powerful enough to run other linear algebra operations of lower time complexity, but not enough to evaluate the delegated linear algebra function.

With respect to (c), [27] proposed a protocol using garbled circuits [40] and fully homomorphic encryption [28]. This protocol delegates functions in settings where the client is powerful enough to run encryption and decryption algorithms of a fully homomorphic encryption scheme, but not enough to homomorphically evaluate a circuit that computes decryption steps in the garbling scheme for the function. Different protocols, not using garbled circuits, were later proposed in [15]. These protocols delegate functions in settings where the client is assumed to be powerful enough to run encryption and decryption algorithms of a fully homomorphic encryption scheme, but not enough to homomorphically evaluate the delegated function.

2 Definitions: Groups with Efficient Membership Proofs

In this section we formally define group notations and definitions that will be used in the rest of the paper.

**Group notations and definitions.** Let \((G, \ast)\) be a group, let \(\sigma\) be its computational security parameter, and let \(L\) denote the length of the binary representation of elements in \(G\). Typically, in cryptographic applications we set \(L\) as about equal to \(\sigma\). We also assume that \((G, \ast)\) is cyclic, has order \(q\), and we fix \(m\) of its distinct generators as \(g_1, \ldots, g_m\). By \(y = g_1^{x_1} \cdots g_m^{x_m} = \prod_{i=1}^{m} g_i^{x_i}\) we denote the product of \(m\) (fixed-base) exponentiations (in \(G\)). Let \(\mathbb{Z}_q = \{0, 1, \ldots, q - 1\}\), and let \(F_{g_1, \ldots, g_m, q} : (\mathbb{Z}_q \times \cdots \times \mathbb{Z}_q) \to G\) denote the function that maps to each \((x_1, \ldots, x_m) \in \mathbb{Z}_q \times \cdots \times \mathbb{Z}_q\) the product of \(m\) (fixed-base) exponentiations (in \(G\)). By \(\text{desc}(F_{g_1, \ldots, g_m, q})\) we denote a conventional description of the function \(F_{g_1, \ldots, g_m, q}\) that includes its semantic meaning as well as generators \(g_1, \ldots, g_m\), order \(q\) and the efficient algorithms computing multiplication and inverses in \(G\).

By \(t_{\text{exp}}(\ell)\) we denote a parameter denoting the number of multiplications in \(G\) used to compute an exponentiation (in \(G\)) of a group value to an arbitrary
ℓ-bit exponent. By \( t_{m,\text{exp}}(\ell) \) we denote a parameter denoting the number of multiplications in \( G \) used to compute \( m \) exponentiations (in \( G \)) of the same group value to \( m \) arbitrary \( \ell \)-bit exponents. By \( t_{\text{prod},m,\text{exp}}(\ell) \) we denote the max number of group multiplications used to compute a product of \( m \) exponentiations of (possibly different) group elements to \( m \) arbitrary \( \ell \)-bit exponents.

We define an efficiently verifiable membership protocol for \( G \) as a one-message protocol, denoted as the pair \((\text{mProve},\text{mVerify})\) of algorithms, satisfying

1. **completeness**: for any \( w \in G \), \( \text{mVerify}(w,\text{mProve}(w))=1 \);
2. **soundness**: for any \( w \notin G \), and any \( \text{mProve}' \),
   \( \text{mVerify}(w,\text{mProve}'(w))=0 \);
3. **efficient verifiability**: the number of multiplications \( t_{\text{mVerify}}(\sigma) \) in \( G \) executed by \( \text{mVerify} \) is \( o(t_{\text{exp}}) \);
4. **efficient provability**: the number of multiplications \( t_{\text{mProve}}(\sigma) \) in \( G \) executed by \( \text{mProve} \) is not significantly larger than \( t_{\text{exp}} \).

We say that a group is **efficient** if its description is short (i.e., has length polynomial in \( \sigma \)), its associated operation and the inverse operation are efficient (i.e., they can be executed in time polynomial in \( \sigma \)), and it has an efficiently verifiable membership protocol. Note that for essentially all cyclic groups frequently used in cryptography, the description is short and both the associated operation and inverse operation can be run in time polynomial in \( \sigma \). The only non-trivial property to establish is whether the group has an efficiently verifiable membership protocol. We now show two examples that are often used in cryptography and that do have efficiently verifiable membership protocols. In the rest of the paper we present our results for any arbitrary efficient cyclic group (using, for notation simplicity, a multiplicative notation for its operation).

**Example 1**: \((G,\ast)=(G_q,\cdot \mod p)\), for large primes \( p,q \) such that \( p = kq + 1 \), where \( k \neq q \) is another prime and \( G_q \) is the \( q \)-order subgroup of \( \mathbb{Z}_p^* \). This group is one of the most recommended for cryptographic schemes like the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [21], El-Gamal encryption [25], Cramer-Shoup encryption [16], DSA etc. It is known that by Sylow’s theorem, \( G_q \) in this case is the only subgroup of order \( q \) in the group \( \mathbb{Z}_p^* \) (i.e. \( g^q = 1 \mod p \) if and only if \( g \in G_q \)). Also, the set of elements of \( G_q \) is precisely the set of \( k \)-th powers of elements of \( \mathbb{Z}_p^* \). Thus, an efficiently verifiable membership protocol can be built as follows:

1. on input \( w \), \( \text{mProve} \) computes \( r = w^{(q+1)/k} \mod p \) and returns \( r \);
2. on input \( w, r \), \( \text{mVerify} \) returns 1 if \( w = r^k \mod p \) and 0 otherwise.

The completeness and soundness properties of this protocol are easily seen to hold. The efficient provability follows by noting that \( \text{mProve} \) only performs 1 exponentiation \( \mod p \). The efficient verifiability property follows by noting that \( \text{mVerify} \) requires one exponentiation \( \mod p \) to the \( k \)-th power. We note that \( \text{mVerify} \) is very efficient in the case when \( k \) is small (e.g., \( k = 2 \)), which is a typical group setting in cryptographic protocols based on discrete logarithms. In the rest of the paper, we assume this specific group when we evaluate the performance of our protocol(s).
Example 2: \((G, +) = (E(F_p), \text{point addition})\), for a large prime \(p > 3\): an elliptic curve \(E\) over a field \(F_p\), is the set of pairs \((x, y) \in F_p\) that satisfy the Weierstrass equation

\[ y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \mod p, \]

together with the imaginary point at infinity \(O\), where \(a, b \in F_p\) and \(4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0 \mod p\). The elliptic curve defined above is denoted by \(E(F_p)\). This group is one of the most recommended for cryptographic schemes like Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, Elliptic-curve ElGamal encryption, etc. Moreover, many discrete logarithm based cryptographic protocols defined over the set \(Z_p\) in Example 1 can be rewritten as defined over \(E(F_p)\). When those protocols are rewritten using the additive operation for this group instead of modular multiplication over \(Z_p\), the multiplication operation is rewritten as point addition and the exponentiation is rewritten as scalar multiplication (i.e., for \(a \in F_p\) and \(P \in E(F_p)\) compute \(aP\), meaning add \(P\) to itself \(a\) times) in the group \(E(F_p)\), and the textbook “square-and-multiply” algorithm becomes a “double-and-add” algorithm. An efficiently verifiable membership protocol for this group simply consists of verifying the Weierstrass equation, as follows:

1. on input \((x, y)\), mProve does nothing;
2. on input \((x, y)\), mVerify returns 1 if \(y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \mod p\) and 0 otherwise.

The completeness, soundness, efficient provability properties of this protocol are easily seen to hold. The efficient verifiability property follows by noting that mVerify performs only 4 multiplications \(\mod p\).

3 Definitions: Delegated Protocols

In this section we formally define delegation protocols, and their correctness, security, privacy and efficiency requirements, mainly relying on the definition approach from [20], which in turn builds on those from [27, 29]. One new aspect in our definition (important for our results in later sections) is that we use a simulation-based definition of privacy instead of the indistinguishability-based definition in [20].

**Basic notations.** The expression \(y \leftarrow T\) denotes the probabilistic process of randomly and independently choosing \(y\) from set \(T\). The expression \(y \leftarrow A(x_1, x_2, \ldots)\) denotes the (possibly probabilistic) process of running algorithm \(A\) on input \(x_1, x_2, \ldots\) and any necessary random coins, and obtaining \(y\) as output. The expression \((z_A, z_B, tr) \leftarrow (A(x_1, x_2, \ldots), B(y_1, y_2, \ldots))\) denotes the (possibly probabilistic) process of running an interactive protocol between \(A\), taking as input \(x_1, x_2, \ldots\) and any necessary random coins, and \(B\), taking as input \(y_1, y_2, \ldots\) and any necessary random coins, where \(z_A, z_B\) are \(A\) and \(B\)’s final outputs, respectively, at the end of this protocol’s execution, and \(tr\) denotes the tuple of messages exchanged between \(A\) and \(B\). We denote a distribution as a sequence \(\{R_1, \ldots, R_n : x\}\), where \(R_1, \ldots, R_n\) are random processes and \(x\) denotes a variable set as a result of their execution.
System scenario, entities, and protocol. We consider a system with a single client, denoted as $C$, and a single server, denoted as $S$. As a client’s computational resources are expected to be more limited than a server’s ones, $C$ is interested in delegating the computation of specific functions to $S$. We assume that the communication link between $C$ and $S$ is private or not subject to confidentiality, integrity, or replay attacks, and note that such attacks can be separately addressed using known communication security techniques. As in all previous work in the area, we consider a model with an offline phase, where, say, exponentiations to random exponents can be precomputed and made somehow available onto $C$’s device. This model has been justified in several ways, all appealing to different application settings. In the presence of a trusted party (say, setting up $C$’s device), the trusted party can simply perform the precomputed exponentiations and store them on $C$’s device. If no trusted party is available, in the presence of a pre-processing phase where $C$’s device does not have significant computation constraints, $C$ can itself perform the precomputed exponentiations and store them on its own device.

Let $\sigma$ denote the computational security parameter (i.e., the parameter derived from hardness considerations on the underlying computational problem), and let $\lambda$ denote the statistical security parameter (i.e., a parameter such that evens with probability $2^{-\lambda}$ are extremely rare). Both parameters are expressed in unary notation (i.e., $1^\sigma, 1^\lambda$).

Let $F: \text{Dom}(F) \rightarrow \text{CoDom}(F)$ be a function, where $\text{Dom}(F)$ denotes $F$’s domain, $\text{CoDom}(F)$ denotes $F$’s co-domain, and $\text{desc}(F)$ denotes $F$’s description. Assuming $\text{desc}(F)$ is known to both $C$ and $S$, and input $x$ is known only to $C$, we define a client-server protocol for the delegated computation of $F$ in the presence of an offline phase as a 2-party, 2-phase, communication protocol between $C$ and $S$, denoted as $(C(1^\sigma, 1^\lambda, \text{desc}(F), x), S(1^\sigma, 1^\lambda, \text{desc}(F)))$, and consisting of the following steps:

1. $pp \leftarrow \text{Offline}(1^\sigma, 1^\lambda, \text{desc}(F))$,
2. $(y_C, y_S, tr) \leftarrow (C(1^\sigma, 1^\lambda, \text{desc}(F), pp, x), S(1^\sigma, 1^\lambda, \text{desc}(F)))$.

As discussed above, Step 1 is executed in an offline phase, when the input $x$ to the function $F$ is not yet available. Step 2 is executed in the online phase, when the input $x$ to the function $F$ is available to $C$. At the end of both phases, $C$ learns $y_C$ (intended to be $y = y$) and $S$ learns $y_S$ (usually an empty string in this paper). We will often omit $\text{desc}(F), 1^\sigma, 1^\lambda$ for brevity of description.

Correctness Requirement. Informally, the (natural) correctness requirement states that if both parties follow the protocol, $C$ obtains some output at the end of the protocol, and this output is, with high probability, equal to the value obtained by evaluating function $F$ on $C$’s input. A formal definition follows.

Definition 1. Let $\sigma, \lambda$ be the security parameters, let $F$ be a function, and let $(C, S)$ be a client-server protocol for the delegated computation of $F$. We say that $(C, S)$ satisfies $\delta_c$-correctness if for any $x$ in $F$’s domain, it holds that

$$\text{Prob \left[ out \leftarrow \text{CorrExp}_F(1^\sigma, 1^\lambda) : out = 1 \right] \geq \delta_c,}$$
for some $\delta_c$ close to 1, where experiment CorrExp is detailed below:

$$\text{CorrExp}_{p}(1^\sigma, 1^\lambda)$$

1. $pp \leftarrow \text{Offline}(\text{desc}(F))$
2. $(y_C, y_S, tr) \leftarrow (C(pp, x), S)$
3. if $y_C = F(x)$ then return: 1
   else return: 0

**Security Requirement.** Informally, the most basic security requirement would state the following: if $C$ follows the protocol, a malicious adversary corrupting $S$ cannot convince $C$ to obtain, at the end of the protocol, some output $y'$ different from the value $y$ obtained by evaluating function $F$ on $C$’s input $x$. To define a stronger security requirement, we augment the adversary’s power so that the adversary can even choose $C$’s input $x$, before attempting to convince $C$ of an incorrect output. We also do not restrict the adversary to run in polynomial time. A formal definition follows.

**Definition 2.** Let $\sigma, \lambda$ be the security parameters, let $F$ be a function, and let $(C, S)$ be a client-server protocol for the delegated computation of $F$. We say that $(C, S)$ satisfies $\epsilon_s$-security against a malicious adversary if for any algorithm $A$, it holds that

$$\text{Prob} \left[ \text{out} \leftarrow \text{SecExp}_{F,A}(1^\sigma, 1^\lambda) : \text{out} = 1 \right] \leq \epsilon_s,$$

for some $\epsilon_s$ close to 0, where experiment SecExp is detailed below:

$$\text{SecExp}_{F,A}(1^\sigma, 1^\lambda)$$

1. $pp \leftarrow \text{Offline}(\text{desc}(F))$
2. $(x, aux) \leftarrow A(\text{desc}(F))$
3. $(y', aux, tr) \leftarrow (C(pp, x), A(aux))$
4. if $y' = \bot$ or $y' = F(x)$ then return: 0
   else return: 1.

**Privacy Requirement.** Informally, the privacy requirement should guarantee the following: if $C$ follows the protocol, a malicious adversary corrupting $S$ cannot obtain any information about $C$’s input $x$ from a protocol execution. This is formalized here by extending the simulation-based approach typically used in various formal definitions for cryptographic primitives. That is, there exists an efficient algorithm, called the simulator, that generates a tuple of messages distributed exactly like those in a random execution of the protocol. A formal definition follows.

**Definition 3.** Let $\sigma, \lambda$ be the security parameters, let $F$ be a function, and let $(C, S)$ be a client-server protocol for the delegated computation of $F$. We say that $(C, S)$ satisfies privacy (in the sense of simulation) against a malicious adversary if there exists an efficient algorithm $\text{Sim}$ such that for any efficient adversary $A$ and any input $x$ to $C$, the following two distributions are equal:

$$D_{\text{sim}} = \{tr \leftarrow \text{Sim}(\text{desc}(F)), 1^\sigma, 1^\lambda) : tr\}$$

$$D_{\text{prot}} = \{pp \leftarrow \text{Offline}(\text{desc}(F)); (y_C, y_A, tr_x) \leftarrow (C(pp, x), A(aux)) : tr_x\}$$
Efficiency Metrics and Requirements. Let \((C, S)\) be a client-server protocol for the delegated computation of function \(F\). We say that \((C, S)\) has efficiency parameters \((t_F, t_P, t_C, t_S, cc, mc)\), if

1. \(F\) can be computed (without delegation) using \(t_F(\sigma, \lambda)\) atomic operations;
2. the offline phase can be run using \(t_P(\sigma, \lambda)\) atomic operations;
3. \(C\) can be run in the online phase using \(t_C(\sigma, \lambda)\) atomic operations;
4. \(S\) can be run using \(t_S(\sigma, \lambda)\) atomic operations;
5. \(C\) and \(S\) exchange a total of at most \(mc\) messages; and
6. \(C\) and \(S\) exchange messages of total length at most \(cc\).

In our analysis, we only consider the most expensive group operations as atomic operations (e.g., group multiplications and/or exponentiation), and neglect lower-order operations (e.g., equality testing, additions and subtractions between group elements). While we naturally try to minimize all these protocol efficiency metrics, our main goal is to design protocols where

1. \(t_C(\sigma, \lambda) = t_F(\sigma, \lambda)\), and
2. \(t_S(\sigma, \lambda)\) is not significantly larger than \(t_F(\sigma, \lambda)\),

based on the underlying assumption, consistent with the state of the art in cryptographic implementations, for essentially all group types, that group multiplication requires significantly less computing resources than group exponentiation.

4 Delegating a Product of Exponentiations

In this section we present our protocol for delegation of a product of (fixed-base) exponentiations in a large class of groups used in cryptographic protocols, which provably satisfies correctness, simulation-based privacy, security with exponentially small probability, and various desirable efficiency properties (most notably, the client’s online complexity is dominated by a single exponentiation to a significantly smaller exponent).

We first formally state our result, then describe the protocol, and finally prove its correctness, security, privacy and efficiency properties.

Formal theorem statement. We obtain the following

Theorem 1. Let \((G, \ast)\) be an efficient cyclic group, let \(\sigma\) be its computational security parameter, and let \(\lambda\) be a statistical security parameter. There exists (constructively) a client-server protocol \((C, S)\) for delegating the computation of function \(F_{g_1,\ldots,g_m,q} : (Z_q \times \ldots \times Z_q) \rightarrow G\), which satisfies

1. \(\delta_c\)-correctness, for \(\delta_c = 1\);
2. \(\epsilon_s\)-security, for \(\epsilon_s \leq \frac{1}{2^{\lambda}}\);
3. simulation-based privacy;
4. efficiency with parameters \((t_F, t_S, t_P, t_C, cc, mc)\), where
   
   - \(t_F\) is \(t_{\text{prod},m,\text{exp}}(\sigma)\);
   - \(t_S\) is \(2t_{\text{prod},m,\text{exp}}(\sigma) + 2t_{\text{prove}}(\sigma)\);
\[-t_P \text{ is } 2t_{\text{prod.m.exp}}(\sigma), \text{ with random exponents from } \mathbb{Z}_q; \]
\[-t_C \text{ is } \leq t_{\text{exp}}(\lambda)+2t_{\text{mverify}}(\sigma)+2 \text{ multiplications in } G \text{ and 1 multiplication in } \mathbb{Z}_q; \]
\[-cc = 4 \text{ elements in } G \text{ and } 2m \text{ in } \mathbb{Z}_q \]
\[-mc = 2.\]

The main takeaway from Theorem 1 is that \(C\) delegates the computation of product of multiple (i.e. \(m\)) exponentiations with a \(\sigma\)-bit exponents to \(S\) while \(C\) only performs an exponentiation with a \(\lambda\)-bit exponent, 2 group membership verifications in \(G\), 2 multiplications in \(G\) and 1 modular multiplication in \(\mathbb{Z}_q\). In other words, \(C\)’s online complexity is only slightly larger than that in a delegation protocol for a single exponentiation (as in the protocol from [20]). In fact, our protocol can be seen as a non-trivial extension of the single exponentiation protocol in [20], saving about a multiplicative factor of \(m\) in the client’s online complexity over a direct use of that protocol to delegate a single exponentiation. Using the group in Example 1 from Section 2 for a concrete comparison, the client performs about \(2\lambda + m\) multiplications, while in a direct use of the protocol in [20] that bound would be \(2m\lambda + 4m\), and in non-delegated computation one can perform up to \(2m\sigma + m\) multiplications. Using current typical settings in applied cryptography (i.e., \(\sigma = 2048\), and \(\lambda = 128\)), and assuming \(m\) ranging from 2 to 128, we see that in our protocol the client’s online multiplications are smaller by 2-3 orders of magnitude than non-delegated computation and 1-2 orders of magnitude with respect to a direct use of the delegation of a single exponentiation from [20].

Also remarkable are the running time of \(S\), who only performs 2 products of \(m\) exponentiations and 2 group membership proof generations in \(G\). In other words, \(S\)’s complexity is only about 4 times as that in a non-delegated computation of the same function.

Even in the offline phase, only 2 products of fixed-base exponentiations with random exponents are needed by the client to later compute a product of \(m\) fixed-base exponentiations. Finally, the protocol only requires 2 messages, which is clearly minimal in this model, and only requires the communication of 4 elements in \(G\) and \(2m\) elements in \(\mathbb{Z}_q\).

In what follows we prove Theorem 1 by (first informally and then) formally describing our delegation protocol, and finally proving its properties. The group membership test is realized via the assumed efficiently verifiable group membership protocol. While we do not know of such a protocol for any arbitrary cyclic group, we showed in Section 2 that two groups commonly used in cryptography have one.

**Informal description of protocol** \((C, S)\). Our starting point is the protocol for efficient, private and secure delegation of fixed-base exponentiation in cyclic groups in [20], also reviewed in Appendix A. There, one main idea consists of a probabilistic verification equation which is verifiable using a much smaller number of modular multiplications (i.e., about \(\lambda\), instead of \(\sigma\), multiplications). Specifically, in that protocol, \(C\) injects an additional random value
$b \in \{1, \ldots, 2^\lambda\}$ in one of the inputs on which $S$ is asked to compute the value of the exponentiation function $F_{g,q}$, so to satisfy the following properties: 
(a) if $S$ returns correct computations of $F_{g,q}$, then $C$ can correctly compute $y$ with a single group multiplication; 
(b) if $S$ returns incorrect computations of $F_{g,q}$, then $S$ either does not meet some deterministic verification equation or can only meet $C$'s probabilistic verification equation for at most one possible value of random value $b$; 
(d) $C$ can check whether the probabilistic verification equation is satisfied with an exponentiation to the (shorter) exponent $b$; and 
(d) $C$'s messages hide the values of the random element as well as $C$'s input to the function. 
By choosing a large enough domain for $b$ (e.g., setting $\lambda \geq 128$), the protocol achieves a very small security probability (i.e., $2^{-\lambda}$). As this domain is much smaller than the group, this results in a considerable efficiency gain on $C$'s running time.

Towards the design of our protocol proving Theorem 1, a first natural approach is that the client delegates each of the $m$ exponentiations in the product using the delegation protocol for fixed-base exponentiation over cyclic groups in [20], and finally the client computes the product of the obtained $m$ exponentiations. Note that this approach would satisfy correctness, privacy and security requirements. However, when it comes to performance, it is undesirable as it multiplies by a factor of about $m$ both the number of multiplications by the client and the size of the client’s storage, and therefore we would gradually lose the computation benefit from the delegation as $m$ gets larger. In the protocol presented here, we target an additive overhead of $m$, instead of a multiplicative one, and achieve this with the following two main modifications.

First, the protocol uses a single random value $b$, instead of $m$ random and independent values, so that $C$ again only performs a single exponentiation to a short exponent to run the probabilistic verification equation.

Second, the products of exponentiations needed in the protocol are carefully redistributed to the offline phase, where more computation power is available, and to the computationally more powerful server (as opposed to being performed by the client). Specifically, our protocol involves 4 products of $m$ exponentiations, of which 2 are performed offline and 2 are computed by the server. This also reduces the client storage required by the offline computation, which remains constant instead of being dependent on $m$, as the above natural approach would require. Finally, the computation of these products is set up so that by the homomorphism properties of the exponentiation function, the same group membership verifications and probabilistic verification tests can be performed (although on products of exponentiations instead of single exponentiations).

**Formal description of protocol** $(C, S)$. Let $G$ be an efficient cyclic group, and let $(\text{mProve}, \text{mVerify})$ denote its efficiently verifiable membership protocol.

**Input to $C$ and $S$:** $1^\sigma, 1^\lambda, \text{desc}(F_{g_1,\ldots,g_m,q})$

**Input to $C$:** $x_1, \ldots, x_m \in \mathbb{Z}_q$

**Offline phase instructions:**
1. Randomly choose $u_{i,j} \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, for $i = 1, \ldots, m$ and $j = 0, 1$  
2. Set $v_j = \prod_{i=1}^{m} g_i^{u_{i,j}}$ and store $(u_{1,j}, \ldots, u_{m,j}, v_j)$ on $C$ for $j = 0, 1$

**Online phase instructions:**

1. $C$ randomly chooses $b \in \{1, \ldots, 2^\lambda\}$  
   $C$ sets $z_{i,0} := (x_i - u_{i,0}) \mod q$, $z_{i,1} := (b \cdot x_i + u_{i,1}) \mod q$ for $i = 1, \ldots, m$  
   $C$ sends $z_{i,j}$ to $S$ for $i = 1, \ldots, m$, $j = 0, 1$
2. $S$ computes $w_j = \prod_{i=1}^{m} g_i^{z_{i,j}}$ and $\pi_j := \text{mProve}(w_j)$, for $j = 0, 1$  
   $S$ sends $w_0, w_1, \pi_0, \pi_1$ to $C$
3. $C$ computes $y := w_0 \ast v_0$  
   $C$ checks that
   
   \[ w_1 = y^b \ast v_1, \] also called the ‘probabilistic test’  
   \[ \text{mVerify}(w_0, \pi_0) = \text{mVerify}(w_1, \pi_1) = 1, \]  
   also called the ‘membership test’  
   if any one of these tests is not satisfied then  
   
   $C$ returns: $\perp$ and the protocol halts

$C$ returns: $y$

**Properties of protocol** $(C, S)$: The efficiency properties are verified by protocol inspection.

- **Round complexity:** the protocol only requires one round, consisting of one message from $C$ to $S$ followed by one message from $S$ to $C$.
- **Communication complexity:** the protocol requires the transfer of 2 elements in $G$ and 2 proofs of group membership from $S$ to $C$, and 2m elements in $\mathbb{Z}_q$ from $C$ to $S$.
- **Runtime complexity:** During the offline phase, 2 product of $m$ exponentiations in bases $g_1, \ldots, g_m$ and with random $\sigma$-bit exponents are performed. This product of $m$ exponentiations can be evaluated any of the cited literature algorithms for a product of $m$ exponentiations (e.g., the algorithm in Section 3.2 of [6]). During the online phase, $S$ computes 2 products of $m$ exponentiations to $\sigma$-bit exponents in $G$ and 2 group membership proofs; and $C$ verifies 2 group membership proofs and computes 2 multiplications in $G$, 1 modular multiplication in $\mathbb{Z}_q$, and 1 exponentiation in $G$ to a random exponent that is $\leq 2^\lambda$ and thus much smaller than $2^\sigma$.

The correctness property follows by showing that if $C$ and $S$ follow the protocol, $C$ always output $y = \prod_{i=1}^{m} g_i^{x_i}$. We show that the 2 tests performed by $C$ are always passed. The membership test is always passed since $w_j$ is computed by $S$ as $\prod_{i=1}^{m} g_i^{b}$, for $j = 0, 1$, and $g_1, \ldots, g_m$ are generators of group $G$; the probabilistic test is always passed since

\[ w_1 = \prod_{i=1}^{m} g_i^{z_{i,1}} = \prod_{i=1}^{m} g_i^{b x_i + u_{i,1}} = \left( \prod_{i=1}^{m} g_i^{x_i} \right)^b \ast \prod_{i=1}^{m} g_i^{u_{i,1}} = y^b v_1. \]
This implies that $C$ never returns $\perp$, and thus returns $y$. To see that this returned value $y$ is the correct output, note that

$$y = w_0 * v_0 = \prod_{i=1}^{m} g_{i}^{z_{i,0}} * \prod_{i=1}^{m} g_{i}^{u_{i,0}} = \prod_{i=1}^{m} g_{i}^{x_i - u_{i,0}} * \prod_{i=1}^{m} g_{i}^{u_{i,0}} = \prod_{i=1}^{m} g_{i}^{x_i}.$$

The privacy property of the protocol against any arbitrary malicious $S$ follows by observing that the distribution of $C$’s only message to $S$ does not depend on values $x_1, \ldots, x_m$. This message is $(z_{1,0}, \ldots, z_{m,0}, z_{1,1}, \ldots, z_{m,1})$ where $z_{i,0} = (x_i - u_{i,0}) \mod q$, $z_{i,1} = (b x_i + u_{i,1}) \mod q$, and $z_{i,0}$ and $z_{i,1}$ are uniformly and independently distributed in $\mathbb{Z}_q$, as so are $u_{i,0}$ and $u_{i,1}$ for all $i = 1, \ldots, m$. Thus, a simulator $\text{Sim}$ can be defined by generating a tuple $(z_{1,0}, \ldots, z_{m,0}, z_{1,1}, \ldots, z_{m,1})$ of random and independent values in $\mathbb{Z}_q$, and then generating the message $(w_0, w_1, \pi_0, \pi_1)$ by simply running the same instructions run by $S$ on input $(z_{1,0}, \ldots, z_{m,0}, z_{1,1}, \ldots, z_{m,1})$. We obtain that distribution $D_{\text{Sim}}$ and distribution $D_{\text{prot}}$ are identical since in both distribution $C$’s message contains $2m$ random and independent values in $\mathbb{Z}_q$ and a message by $S$ computed in exactly the same way starting from $C$’s message.

To prove the security property against any malicious $S$ we need to compute an upper bound $\varepsilon_s$ on the security probability that $S$ convinces $C$ to output a $y$ such that $y \neq F_{g_1, \ldots, g_m, q}(x_1, \ldots, x_m)$. We start by defining the following events with respect to a random execution of $(C, S)$ where $C$ uses $x$ as input:

- $\varepsilon_{y \neq \cdot}$, defined as ‘$C$ outputs $y$ such that $y \neq F_{g_1, \ldots, g_m, q}(x_1, \ldots, x_m)$’
- $\varepsilon_{\perp}$, defined as ‘$C$ outputs $\perp$’

By inspection of $(C, S)$, we directly obtain the following fact.

*Fact 4.1.* If event $\varepsilon_{y \neq \cdot}$ happens then event $(-\varepsilon_{\perp})$ happens.

With respect to a random execution of $(C, S)$ where $C$ uses $x_1, \ldots, x_m$ as input, we now define the following events:

- $\varepsilon_{1,b}$, defined as ‘$\exists$ exactly one $b$ such that $S$’s message $(w_0, w_1)$ satisfies $w_1 = (w_0 * v_0)^b * v_1$’
- $\varepsilon_{>1,b}$, defined as ‘$\exists$ more than one $b$ such that $S$’s message $(w_0, w_1)$ satisfies $w_1 = (w_0 * v_0)^b * v_1$’.

By definition, events $\varepsilon_{1,b}, \varepsilon_{>1,b}$ are each other’s complement event.

Now, let $i \in \{1, \ldots, m\}$. We observe that no information is leaked by $z_{i,0}, z_{i,1}$ about $x_i$ as: (a) for any $x_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, there is exactly one $u_{i,0}$ corresponding to $z_{i,0}$; that is, $u_{i,0} = x_i - z_{i,0} \mod q$; (b) for any $x_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, for any $b \in \{1, \ldots, 2^k\}$ chosen by $C$, there is exactly one $u_{i,1}$ corresponding to $z_{i,1}$; that is, $u_{i,1} = z_{i,1} - b x_i \mod q$ for all $i = 1, \ldots, m$. This implies that, since $u_{i,0}, u_{i,1}$ are uniformly and independently distributed in $\mathbb{Z}_q$, the distribution of $x_i$ conditioned on $z_{i,0}, z_{i,1}$ is also uniform in $\mathbb{Z}_q$. Furthermore, by essentially the same proof, protocol $(C, S)$ satisfies the following property: for any $x_i, z_{i,0}$ and $z_{i,1}$ do not leak any information about $b$ for $i = 1, \ldots, m$. This implies that all values in $\{1, \ldots, 2^k\}$ are still
equally likely even when conditioning over message \((z_{1,0}, \ldots, z_{m,0}, z_{1,1}, \ldots, z_{m,1})\). Then, if event \(e_{1,b}\) is true, the probability that \(S\)'s message \((w_0, w_1)\) satisfies the probabilistic test, is 1 divided by the number \(2^\lambda\) of values of \(b\) that are still equally likely even when conditioning over message \((z_{1,0}, \ldots, z_{m,0}, z_{1,1}, \ldots, z_{m,1})\). We obtain the following.

**Fact 4.2.** \(\text{Prob}\left[ -e_\perp | e_{1,b} \right] \leq 1/2^\lambda\)

We now show the main technical claim, saying that if \(S\) is malicious then it cannot produce in step 2 of the protocol values \(w'_0, w'_1\) satisfying both of \(C\)'s 2 tests relatively to two distinct values \(b_1, b_2 \in \{1, \ldots, 2^\lambda\}\):

Since \(S\) can be malicious, in step 2 it can send arbitrary values to \(C\). Differently saying, \(C\) can send \(w'_j\) for \(j = 0, 1\) either \(w'_j = w_j\) or \(w'_j \neq w_j\), where \(w_j = \prod_{i=1}^m g^{z_{i,j}}\). Since the group \(G\) is cyclic, \(g_i\) is generator of \(G\) wlog we consider \(g_1\) is generator of the group \(G\) and \(C\) uses \(\pi_0, \pi_1\) to check in step 3 that \(w'_j \in G\), we can write:

\[
w'_j = g_i^u \ast w_0 \quad \text{and} \quad w'_1 = g_i^v \ast w_1 \quad \text{for some} \quad u, v \in \mathbb{Z}_q
\]

then \(y = w'_0 \ast v_0 = g_i^u \ast w_0 \ast v_0 = g_i^u \ast \prod_{i=1}^m g_i^{z_{i,1}}\). Now, recall that the goal of a malicious \(S\) is to pass \(C\)'s two verification tests and force \(C\)'s output to be \(y \neq \prod_{i=1}^m g_i^{z_{i,1}}\), which is true when \(u \neq 0 \mod q\). Now, consider the following equivalent rewriting of \(C\)'s probabilistic test, obtained by variable substitutions and simplifications:

\[
\begin{align*}
w'_1 &= y^b \ast v_1 \\
g_i^v \ast w_1 &= \left( g_i^u \ast \prod_{i=1}^m g_i^{z_{i,1}} \right)^b \ast \prod_{i=1}^m g_i^{u_{i,1}} \\
g_i^v \ast \prod_{i=1}^m g_i^{z_{i,1}} &= g_i^{ub} \ast \prod_{i=1}^m g_i^{bx_{i,1} + u_{i,1}} \\
g_i^v \ast \prod_{i=1}^m g_i^{x_{i,1} + u_{i,1}} &= g_i^{ub} \ast \prod_{i=1}^m g_i^{x_{i,1} + u_{i,1}} \\
g_i^v &= g_i^{ub} \\
v &= ub \mod q.
\end{align*}
\]

Notice that if \(u = 0 \mod q\) then the above calculation implies that \(v = 0 \mod q\), and thus \(S\) is honest, from which we derive that \(\epsilon_s = 0\). Now consider the case \(S\) is dishonest, in which case we have that \(u \neq 0 \mod q\). We want to show that \(b\) is unique in this case. If there exist two distinct \(b_1\) and \(b_2\) such that

\[
ub_1 = v \mod q \quad \text{and} \quad ub_2 = v \mod q
\]

then \(u(b_1 - b_2) = 0 \mod q\) then \(b_1 - b_2 = 0 \mod q\) (i.e \(b_1 = b_2\)) because \(u \neq 0 \mod q\). This shows that \(b\) is unique and we obtain the following fact.
Fact 4.3. \( \text{Prob}\{e_{>1,b}\} = 0 \)

The rest of the proof consists of computing an upper bound \( \epsilon_s \) on the probability of event \( e_{y,\neq} \). We have the following

\[
\text{Prob}\{e_{y,\neq}\} \leq \text{Prob}\{-e_\perp\} = \text{Prob}\{e_{1,b}\} \cdot \text{Prob}\{-e_\perp|e_{1,b}\} + \text{Prob}\{e_{>1,b}\} \cdot \text{Prob}\{-e_\perp|e_{>1,b}\} \\
= \text{Prob}\{e_{1,b}\} \cdot \frac{1}{2^\lambda} \\
\leq \frac{1}{2^\lambda},
\]

where the first inequality follows from Fact 4.1, the first equality follows from the definition of events \( e_{1,b}, e_{>1,b} \) and the conditioning rule, the second equality follows from Fact 4.3, and the second inequality follows from Fact 4.2.

We can finally set \( \epsilon_s = 2^{-\lambda} \), which concludes the proof for the security property for \((C,S)\).  

\[\square\]

4.1 Performance

A naive algorithm to compute (without delegation) a product of \( m \) exponentiations consists of first computing single exponentiations \( y_i = g_i^{x_i} \) for \( i = 1, \ldots, m \), and then the product \( \prod_{i=1}^{m} y_i \). For this algorithm, which we call \( nPoExp \), we have that \( t_{\text{prod}, m, \text{exp}}(\ell) = m \cdot t_{\text{exp}}(\ell) + m - 1 \), which is equal to \( 2m\sigma + m - 1 \), when a single exponentiation is computed using the square-and-multiply algorithm.

Several papers propose faster algorithms to compute single exponentiations (see, e.g., [7, 10, 23]), as well as a product of \( m \) exponentiations (see, e.g., [38, 10, 34]). For instance, in [6], based on [10], the authors present an algorithm, which we call \( fPoExp \), that computes a product of \( m \) exponentiations to \( \sigma \)-bit exponents with at most \( m\sigma + m \) multiplications.

As yet another comparison method to delegate the computation of a product of \( m \) exponentiations to \( \sigma \)-bit exponent, we define protocol \( nDelPoExp \) in which a client delegates to a server the computation of each of the \( m \) exponentiations using Protocol 1 from [20] and then computing a product of the \( m \) obtained exponentiations.

In Table 1 we evaluate the main performance metric for our protocol and compare it with that of (delegated) protocol \( nDelPoExp \) and (non-delegated) algorithms \( nPoExp \) and \( fPoExp \), when computing exponentiation in group \( \mathbb{Z}_p^* \) for \( p = 2q + 1 \), where \( p, q \) are primes. First we show the numbers for \( t_C \) (i.e., \( C \)'s group multiplications in the online phase) for varying and arbitrary values of \( m \), while setting \( \sigma = 2048 \) and \( \lambda = 128 \) (currently recommended parameter settings for cryptographic applications). Finally, in the last row we show closed-form expressions for \( t_C \) with respect to arbitrary \( m, \sigma, \lambda \).
Table 1. Comparison of number of C’s online multiplications in \( \mathbb{Z}_p^* \) where \( p = 2q + 1 \)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( m )</th>
<th>No delegation</th>
<th>With delegation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>8,193</td>
<td>520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>20,484</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>40,969</td>
<td>2,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>204,849</td>
<td>13,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>409,699</td>
<td>26,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>4,096,999</td>
<td>260,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbitrary ( m )</td>
<td>( 4,097m - 1 )</td>
<td>( 2,048(m + 1) )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5 Delegating Signature Schemes

In this section we show efficient, private and secure delegation schemes for well-known (i.e., ElGamal, Schnorr and Okamoto’s) signature schemes using the delegation of a product of (fixed-base) exponentiation for cyclic groups from Section 4. We start the presentation by recalling in Section 5.1 the definition of signature schemes in the standard (i.e., non-delegated) model. In Section 5.2 we augment this definition so to additionally take into account eavesdropping and oracle query attacks in the delegated model. Then, in Section 5.3 we present a general result that shows how to convert signature schemes in the non-delegated model into signature schemes in the delegated model by using a suitable delegation protocol. Finally, in Section 5.4 we show delegated ElGamal, Schnorr and Okamoto’s signature schemes.

5.1 Definitions: Signature Schemes in the standard model

We now recall the definition of digital signature schemes in the standard (i.e., non-delegated) model.

Notations and algorithm syntax. An oracle, denoted as \( O(\cdot) \), is a function. An oracle algorithm, denoted as \( A^{O(\cdot)} \), is an algorithm that during its computation can repeatedly make a query to the oracle and obtain the corresponding oracle’s output.

In a signature scheme \( SS \), we consider two types of parties: signers and verifiers, and three algorithms: a key-generation algorithm \( KG \), a signing algorithm \( Sign \), and a verification algorithm \( Ver \), satisfying the following syntax and requirements.

On input a security parameter \( 1^\sigma \), algorithm \( KG \) returns a public key \( pk \) and a matching secret key \( sk \). On input a message \( m \) of arbitrary length, algorithm \( Sign \) returns a signature \( sig \). On input a putative message \( m' \), and a putative signature \( sig' \), algorithm \( Ver \) returns a bit = 1 (resp., 0) to denote that \( sig' \) is a valid (resp., not valid) signature of \( m' \).
Requirements: Correctness and Unforgeability. Informally speaking, the correctness requirement states that if both signer and verifier correctly run the algorithms, the verifier can recognize the signer’s signature as valid; and the unforgeability requirement states that no efficient algorithm querying the signature oracle can produce a message with a valid signature. Formal definitions follow.

Definition 4. We say that SS=(KG,Sign,Ver) satisfies $\delta$-correctness if for any message $m \in \{0,1\}^*$, it holds that

$$\text{Prob} \left[ (pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{KG}(1^\sigma); \text{sig} \leftarrow \text{Sign}(pk, sk, m) : \text{Ver}(pk, m, \text{sig}) = 1 \right] \geq \delta,$$

for some $\delta$ close to 1.

Definition 5. We say that the signature scheme SS=(KG,Sign,Ver) satisfies existential $\epsilon$-unforgeability under chosen message attack (briefly, $\epsilon$-cma-EU) if for any efficient oracle algorithm $A$, it holds that

$$\text{Prob} \left[ \text{out} \leftarrow \text{SecExp}_{SS, A}(1^\sigma) : \text{out} = 1 \right] \leq \epsilon,$$

for some $\epsilon$ close to 0, where experiment SecExp is detailed below:

$\text{SecExp}_{SS, A}(1^\sigma)$
1. $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{KG}(1^\sigma)$
2. $(m', \text{sig}') \leftarrow A\text{Sign}(pk, sk, \cdot)(pk)$
3. Let $Q$ be the set of message queries made by $A$ to oracle Sign$(pk, sk, \cdot)$
4. if $m' \in Q$ or Ver$(pk, sk, m', \text{sig}') = 0$ then return: 0
   else return: 1.

5.2 Definitions: Delegated Signature Schemes

Given a (non-delegated) signature scheme SS = (KG,Sign,Ver), as defined in Section 5.1, and a delegation protocol $(C, S)$ for a function $F$, as defined in Section 3, we now formally define an associated delegated signature scheme dSS.

Notations and algorithm syntax. We consider three parties: a signer, a verifier, and a server, where during their computations the signer and/or the verifier may act as clients interacting with the server.

Since in this paper we only use one-round client-server delegation protocols, for each one-round delegation protocol $(C, S)$ for a function $F$, we define an $(F, C, S)$-associated server oracle, denoted as $S(\text{desc}(F), 1^\sigma, 1^\lambda, \cdot)$, as the oracle taking as query input $C$’s message in $(C, S)$ and returning as output the server $S$’s response to this message according to protocol $(C, S)$. We also define the $(F, C, S)$-associated oracle signature algorithm Sign$^S$ as an oracle algorithm that is semantically equivalent to the signature algorithm Sign from SS, in the sense that on the same input, the final output from Sign$^S$ is identical to the output from Sign (but in the middle of its computation, Sign$^S$ may also perform queries to $S$). Analogously, we define the $(F, C, S)$-associated oracle verifying algorithm Ver$^S$ as an oracle algorithm that is semantically equivalent to the verification
algorithm \text{Ver} from SS, in the sense that on the same input, the final output from \text{Ver}^S is identical to the output from \text{Ver} (but in the middle of its computation, \text{Ver}^S may also perform queries to \text{S}).

Finally, we formally define the \((SS,F,C,S)-associated delegated signature scheme\) dSS as the tuple \((S, KG, \text{Sign}^S, \text{Ver}^S)\), where \(S\) is the server oracle associated with protocol \((C,S)\), \(KG\) is the same key-generation algorithm as in SS, \(\text{Sign}^S\) is the \((F,C,S)-associated oracle signature algorithm\) and \(\text{Ver}^S\) is the \((F,C,S)-associated oracle verification algorithm\).

In our formal description of the protocols, we will actually separate algorithms \(\text{Sign}^S\) and \(\text{Ver}^S\) into an offline-phase and online-phase version, for the purpose of minimizing the online complexity; however, to reduce notation in the description of the model, in this subsection we keep both offline and online version as a single algorithm.

**Requirements: Correctness and Unforgeability.** The requirements of correctness and unforgeability for dSS are also obtained by suitably augmenting those for SS. In the case of correctness, the extension is immediate. In the case of unforgeability, we replace the adversary \(A\)'s oracle \(\text{Sign}\) with two oracles:

1. an augmented oracle \(\text{dSign}(pk,sk,\cdot)\) which, on input message \(m\), returns a signature \(\text{sig}\) as well as the transcript of any query/answer interaction with the server oracle \(S\) performed by \(\text{Sign}\) during the generation of \(\text{sig}\);
2. the server oracle \(S(desc(F),1^\sigma,1^{\lambda},\cdot)\), which, on input \(C\)'s query message \(qmes_C\), returns \(S\)'s response to \(qmes_C\) in an execution of protocol \((C,S)\).

Note that by giving the adversary access to oracle \(\text{dSign}\), we model the adversary’s eavesdropping attacks on executions of the delegation protocol between a signer (acting as client) and the server, as well as between a verifier (acting as client) and the server. Moreover, by giving the adversary access to oracle \(S\), we model the adversary’s interaction with the server while colluding with a signer or verifier. Formal definitions of correctness and unforgeability requirements for dSS follow.

**Definition 6.** Let \(F\) be a function, and \((C,S)\) be a delegation protocol for \(F\), and let \(S\) be the \((F,C,S)-associated server oracle\). We say that the \((F,C,S)-associated delegated signature scheme dSS = (S, KG, Sign^S, Ver^S)\) satisfies \(\delta\)-correctness if for any message \(m \in \{0,1\}^*\), it holds that

\[
\Pr \left[ (pk,sk) \leftarrow KG(1^\sigma); sig \leftarrow Sign^S(pk,sk,m); Ver^S(pk,m,sig) = 1 \right] \geq \delta,
\]

for some \(\delta\) close to 1.

**Definition 7.** Let \(F\) be a function, and \((C,S)\) be a delegation protocol for \(F\), and let \(S\) be the \((F,C,S)-associated server oracle\). We say that the \((F,C,S)-associated delegated signature scheme dSS = (S, KG, Sign^S, Ver^S)\) satisfies existential \(\epsilon\)-unforgeability under chosen message attack (briefly, \(\epsilon\)-cma-EU) if for any efficient oracle algorithm \(A\), it holds that

\[
\Pr \left[ out \leftarrow \text{SecExp}_{dSS,A}(1^\sigma); out = 1 \right] \leq \epsilon,
\]
for some $\epsilon$ close to 0, where experiment SecExp is detailed below:

$$\text{SecExp}_{\text{dSS},A}(1^\sigma)$$
1. $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{KG}(1^\sigma)$
2. $(m', sig') \leftarrow A^{\text{dSign}(pk, sk, \cdot), \text{S}(\cdot)(pk)}$
3. Let $Q$ be the set of message queries made by $A$ to oracle $\text{dSign}(pk, sk, \cdot)$
   if $m' \in Q$ or $\text{Ver}^S(pk, sk, m', sig') = 0$ then return: 0
   else return: 1.

### 5.3 Delegated Signature Schemes: a general result

We show the relationship between non-delegated signature schemes, delegation protocols and delegated signature schemes in the following theorem.

**Theorem 2.** Let $F$ be a function, and $(C, S)$ be a delegation protocol for $F$, and let $S$ be the $(F, C, S)$-associated server oracle. Also, let $SS = (\text{KG}, \text{Sign}, \text{Ver})$ be a (non-delegated) signature scheme and let $dSS = (S, \text{KG}, \text{Sign}^S, \text{Ver}^S)$ be the $(F, C, S)$-associated delegated signature scheme. If $SS$ satisfies $\delta$-correctness and $\epsilon$-unforgeability under chosen message attack, then $dSS$ satisfies $\delta'$-correctness and $\epsilon'$-unforgeability under chosen message attack, for $\delta' = \delta$ and $\epsilon' = \epsilon$.

The main takeaway from Theorem 2 is to provide a shortcut to provably turn a conventional signature scheme into a delegated signature scheme, as defined in Section 5.2: just design a suitable delegation protocol, as defined in Section 3, for a function $F$ of interest in the computation or verification of a signature. In particular, the delegated signature scheme comes with protection of the original signature scheme against more powerful attacks such as eavesdropping on the delegation protocol messages, and querying the server oracle.

Critical to establish the relationship in the theorem is the delegation protocol’s simulation-based privacy property. First of all, we observe that the correctness property of the delegated signature scheme directly follows from the analogue property of the original signature scheme. Then, we show that the unforgeability of the delegated signature scheme follows by the unforgeability of the non-delegated signature scheme and the delegation protocol’s simulation-based privacy property. Specifically, assume an adversary $A$ is able to violate the unforgeability of the delegated signature scheme. One can construct an adversary $A'$ that violates the unforgeability of the non-delegated signature scheme, as follows:

1. $A'$ runs algorithm $A$ and processes $A$’s queries as follows:
2. When $A$ queries $d\text{Sign}(pk, sk, \cdot)$ with message $m$, $A'$ does the following:
   $A'$ queries $\text{Sign}(pk, sk, \cdot)$ with message $m$, thus obtaining signature $sig$
   $A'$ runs simulator $\text{Sim}$ to obtain the transcripts $\{tr\}$ containing
   queries to $S$ and replies from $S$ performed during
   the executions of algorithms $\text{Sign}^S$ and $\text{Ver}^S$
   $A'$ simulates the oracle $d\text{Sign}(pk, sk, \cdot)$’s answer as $(sig, \{tr\})$
3. When $A$ queries $S(\cdot)$ with message $qmes_C$, $A'$ does the following:
   - $A'$ runs $S$ on input query message $qmes_C$ thus obtaining answer $qans_S$
   - $A'$ simulates the oracle $S(\cdot)$'s answer as $qans_S$

We note that the simulation-based privacy of the delegation protocol for $F$ implies that the the success of $A'$ in breaking $SS$ is the same as the success of $A$ in breaking $dSS$. The theorem follows.

5.4 Delegating ElGamal, Schnorr and Okamoto’s Schemes

In this section we show delegated signature protocols for 3 well-known signature schemes: those by El Gamal [25], Schnorr [37] and Okamoto [36]. In each case, the delegated signature scheme, denoted as $dSS$, is obtained by combining the non-delegated signature scheme, denoted as $SS$ and reviewed in Appendix A, with the delegation protocol $(C, S)$ for a product of exponentiations in the associated group, described in Section 4, and then applying Theorem 2. In all considered non-delegated signature schemes, the signer or verifier’s online complexity is dominated by (or can be written as dominated by) a product of 2 or 3 fixed-base exponentiations. In the design of each $dSS$ scheme, we replace each of these products with an execution of protocol $(C, S)$ and also carefully split the signature and verification computations between offline and online phases of the two algorithms. This results in savings of a factor between 40 and 60 on the online complexity of signers and verifiers.

In what follows, we describe the delegated signature schemes assuming that the client can efficiently perform group multiplications and inverses. A description that only assumes that signers and verifiers can efficiently perform group multiplications can be directly derived by replacing every inverse computation by a signer or verifier with a delegation protocol for the inverse function (using, e.g., the protocol from [12] which only requires 3 multiplications from the client).

**Delegated El Gamal Signature Scheme.** Our delegated version of the signature scheme in [25] uses a client-server protocol $(C, S)$ for the delegation of function $F_{g,y,p}$ and a cryptographic hash function $H$, and goes as follows.

1. **Key generation:** Let $g$ be a generator of $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ where $p$ is large prime $p$. Randomly choose $x \in \{1, \ldots, p - 2\}$ and set $y := g^x \mod p$. The public key is $(p, g, y)$ and the private key is $x$.
2. **Offline Signing:** on input public key $(p, g, y)$ and private key $x$, choose random $k \in \{1, \ldots, p - 1\}$ such that $\gcd(k, p - 1) = 1$ and set $r := (g^k \mod p) \mod q$. Output offline signature $(r)$.
3. **Online Signing:** on input public key $(p, g, y)$, private key $x$, offline signature $(r)$ and a message $m$, compute $s := k^{-1}(H(m) - xr) \mod p - 1$ and output signature $(r, s)$ if $0 < r < p$ and $0 < s < p - 1$ or $\perp$ otherwise.
4. **Offline Verifying:** on input a public key $(p, g, y)$, run the offline phase of the delegation protocol $(C, S)$ resulting in offline output $pp$. 
5. **Online Verifying**: on input a public key \((p, g, y)\), offline output \(pp\), a message \(m\), and a signature \((r, s)\) with \(0 < r < p\) and \(0 < s < p - 1\), compute \(x_1 = H(m)/s \mod (p - 1)\) and \(x_2 = -r/s \mod (p - 1)\), query \(S\) with inputs \(g_1 = g, g_2 = y, x_1\) and \(x_2\), and use \(S\)'s reply to compute the product \(\pi\). Finally, check that \(\pi = r \mod p\).

Note that in the scheme the verification algorithm checks whether

\[
g^{H(m)s^{-1}} y^{-rs^{-1}} = r \mod p,
\]

which is equivalent to the check

\[
g^{H(m)} = y^r r^s \mod p
\]

in the original ElGamal’s scheme. We also note that contrarily to the original scheme, in the above there is a negligible probability (when \(r = 0\) or \(s = 0\)) that \(\text{Sign}\) does not compute a valid signature.

**The delegated Schnorr Signature Scheme.** Our delegated version of the signature scheme in [37] uses a client-server protocol \((C, S)\) for the delegation of function \(F_{g,y,q}\) and a cryptographic hash function \(H\), and goes as follows.

1. **Key generation**: Let \(g\) be a generator of group \(G\) of prime order, \(q\). Randomly choose \(x \in \mathbb{Z}_q\) and set \(y := g^x\). The public key is \((G, q, g, y)\) and the private key is \(x\).
2. **Offline Signing**: on input public key \((G, q, g, y)\) and private key \(x\), choose random \(k \in \mathbb{Z}_q\) and set \(I := g^k\). Output offline signature \(I\).
3. **Online Signing**: on input public key \((G, q, g, y)\), private key \(x\), offline signature \(I\) and a message \(m\), compute \(r := H(I, m)\) and \(s := rx + k \mod q\). Output signature \((r, s)\).
4. **Offline Verifying**: on input a public key \((G, q, g, y)\), run the offline phase of the delegation protocol \((C, S)\) resulting in offline output \(pp\).
5. **Online Verifying**: on input public key \((G, q, g, y)\), a message \(m\), offline output \(pp\) and signature \((r, s)\), set \(x_1 = s\) and \(x_2 = -r \mod q\), query \(S\) with inputs \(g_1 = g, g_2 = y, x_1\) and \(x_2\), and use \(S\)'s reply to compute the product \(\pi\). Finally, check that \(H(\pi, m) = r \mod p\).

5.5 **The Okamoto Signature Scheme**

The delegated Okamoto signature scheme uses a client-server protocol \((C, S)\) for the delegation of function \(F_{g,y,q}\) and a cryptographic hash function \(H\), and goes as follows.

1. **Key generation**: Let \(p = kq + 1\) where \(p\) and \(q\) are primes and \(k\) be an integer (e.g., \(q \geq 2^{140}\) and \(p \geq 2^{512}\)). Choose \(g_1\) and \(g_2\) of order \(q\) in the group \(\mathbb{Z}_p\), and an integer \(t = \mathcal{O}(|p|)\). (e.g., \(t \geq 20\)) Randomly choose \(s_1, s_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q\) and set \(v := g_1^{s_1} g_2^{-s_2} \mod p\). The public key is \((p, q, g_1, g_2, t, v)\) and the private key is \((s_1, s_2)\).
2. **Offline Signing:** on input public key \((p, q, g_1, g_2, t, v)\) and private key \((s_1, s_2)\) and a message \(m\), let \(H\) be the hash function, choose random \(r_1, r_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q\), set \(x := g_1^{r_1} \cdot g_2^{r_2} \mod p\) and output offline signature \(x\).

3. **Online Signing:** on input public key \((p, q, g_1, g_2, t, v)\) and private key \((s_1, s_2)\), offline signature \(x\) and a message \(m\), compute \(e := H(x, m) \in \mathbb{Z}_q\), followed by \((y_1, y_2)\) such that \(y_1 = r_1 + es_1 \mod q\) and \(y_2 = r_2 + es_2 \mod q\). Output signature \((e, y_1, y_2)\).

4. **Offline Verifying:** on input a public key \((p, q, g_1, g_2, t, v)\), run the offline phase of the delegation protocol \((C, S)\) resulting in offline output \(pp\).

5. **Online Verifying:** on input a public key \((p, q, g_1, g_2, t, v)\), offline output \(pp\), a message \(m\), and signature \((e, y_1, y_2)\), set \(x_1 = y_1, x_2 = y_2, x_3 = e\), query \(S\) with inputs \(g_1, g_2\) and \(g_3 = v\), and use \(S\)'s reply to compute the product \(\pi\). Finally, check that \(H(\pi, m) = e \mod p\).

6 Conclusions

We considered the problem of delegating the computation of a product of group exponentiations to a single, possibly malicious, server. We solved this problem by showing a protocol that provably satisfies formal correctness, privacy, security and efficiency requirements, in a large class of cyclic groups; specifically, cyclic groups whose multiplication and inverse operations can be efficiently computed, and which admit an efficiently verifiable protocol to prove that an element is in the group. The considered class of cyclic groups includes groups often discussed in cryptography literature, such as prime-order subgroups in \(\mathbb{Z}_p\) and elliptic curve groups.

As an application, we showed the first private, secure and efficient delegated (to a single, possibly malicious, server) versions of an entire cryptographic scheme. Previous research only delegated a single operation of a scheme’s algorithm. Specifically, we showed delegated versions of well-known signature schemes whose most expensive computations could be rephrased as products of exponentiations over cyclic groups.

In future versions of the paper we plan to consider products of exponentiations over different groups, and highlight applications to more signature schemes.

Finally, we believe that our methods provide hope towards private, secure and efficient delegation of more expensive cryptographic protocols to a single, possibly malicious, server.

References


A Delegation of a Single Fixed-Base Exponentiation

Let $(G, \ast)$ be a cyclic group having order $q$, efficient operation, efficiently computable inverses, and an efficiently verifiable membership protocol, denoted as (mProve, mVerify). Let $g$ be a generator for $G$, and denote as $y = g^x$ a *(fixed-base) exponentiation* (in $G$). Let $\mathbb{Z}_q = \{0, 1, \ldots, q - 1\}$, and let $F_{g,q} : (\mathbb{Z}_q \times \ldots \times \mathbb{Z}_q) \to G$ denote the function that maps to each $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ a fixed-base exponentiations (in $G$). By desc($F_{g,q}$) we denote a conventional description of the function $F_{g,q}$ that includes its semantic meaning as well as generator $g$, order $q$ and the efficient algorithms computing multiplication and inverses in $G$. The delegation protocol for a fixed-base exponentiation in $G$ was formally defined in [20] as follows.

**Input to S:** $1^\sigma, 1^\lambda, \text{desc}(F_{g,q})$

**Input to C:** $1^\sigma, 1^\lambda, \text{desc}(F_{g,q}), x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$

**Offline phase instructions:**
1. Randomly choose $u_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, for $i = 0, 1$
2. Set $v_i = g^{u_i}$ and store $(u_i, v_i)$ on C, for $i = 0, 1$

**Online phase instructions:**
1. C randomly chooses $b \in \{1, \ldots, 2^\lambda\}$
   C sets $z_0 := (x - u_0) \mod q$, $z_1 := (b \cdot x + u_1) \mod q$
   C sends $z_0, z_1$ to S
2. S computes $w_i := g^{z_i}$ and $\pi_i := \text{mProve}(w_i)$, for $i = 0, 1$
   S sends $w_0, w_1, \pi_0, \pi_1$ to C
3. If $x = 0$
   C returns: $y = 1$ and the protocol halts
   if mVerify($w_i, \pi_i$) = 0 for some $i \in \{0, 1\}$, then
   C returns: $\bot$ and the protocol halts
   C computes $y := w_0 \ast v_0$
   C checks that
   $y \neq 1$, also called the ‘distinctness test’
   $w_1 = y^b \ast v_1$, also called the ‘probabilistic test’
   mVerify($w_0, \pi_0$) = mVerify($w_1, \pi_1$) = 1,
   also called the ‘membership test’
   if any one of these tests is not satisfied then
   C returns: $\bot$ and the protocol halts
   C returns: $y$
B Signature Schemes

B.1 ElGamal Signature Scheme

The ElGamal signature scheme is as follows.

1. **Key generation:** Let \( g \) be a generator of \( \mathbb{Z}_p^* \) where \( p \) is a large prime. Randomly choose \( x \in \{1, \ldots, p-1\} \) and set \( y := g^x \mod p \). The public key is \((p, g, y)\) and the private key is \( x \).

2. **Signing:** on input private key \( x \) and a message \( m \), let \( H \) be the hash function, choose random \( k \in \{1, \ldots, p-1\} \) such that \( \gcd(k, p-1) = 1 \) and set \( r := g^k \mod p \) then compute \( s := k^{-1}(H(m) - xr) \mod p \). (If \( s = 0 \) then start again.) Output signature \((r, s)\).

3. **Verifying:** on input a public key \((p, g, y)\), a message \( m \), and signature \((r, s)\) with \( 0 < r < p \) and \( 0 < s < p - 1 \). The verification checks whether
\[
g^{H(m)} \overset{?}{=} y^r r^s \mod p.
\]

B.2 The Schnorr Signature Scheme

The Schnorr signature scheme is as follows.

1. **Key generation:** Let \( g \) be a generator of group \( G \) of prime order, \( q \). Randomly choose \( x \in \mathbb{Z}_q \) and set \( y := g^x \). The public key is \((G, q, g, y)\) and the private key is \( x \).

2. **Signing:** on input private key \( x \) and a message \( m \), let \( H \) be the hash function, choose random \( k \in \mathbb{Z}_q \) and set \( I := g^k \) then compute \( r := H(I, m) \), followed by \( s \) such that \( r = x + k \mod q \). Output signature \((r, s)\).

3. **Verifying:** on input a public key \((G, q, g, y)\), a message \( m \), and signature \((r, s)\), compute \( I := g^r \cdot y^{-r} \). The verification checks whether
\[
H(I, m) \overset{?}{=} r
\]

B.3 The Okamoto Signature Scheme

The Okamoto signature scheme [36] is as follows.

1. **Key generation:** Let \( p = kq + 1 \) where \( p \) and \( q \) are primes and \( k \) be an integer (e.g., \( q \geq 2^{140} \) and \( p \geq 2^{512} \)). Choose \( g_1 \) and \( g_2 \) of order \( q \) in the group \( \mathbb{Z}_p^* \), and an integer \( t = \mathcal{O}(|p|) \). (e.g., \( t \geq 20 \)) Randomly choose \( s_1, s_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q \) and set \( v := g_1^{-s_1} \cdot g_2^{-s_2} \mod p \). The public key is \((p, q, g_1, g_2, t, v)\) and the private key is \((s_1, s_2)\).

2. **Signing:** on input private key \((s_1, s_2)\) and a message \( m \), let \( H \) be the hash function, choose random \( r_1, r_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q \) and set \( x := g_1^{r_1} \cdot g_2^{r_2} \mod p \) then compute \( e := H(x, m) \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^t} \), followed by \((y_1, y_2)\) such that \( y_1 = r_1 + es_1 \mod q \) and \( y_2 = r_2 + es_2 \mod q \). Output signature \((e, y_1, y_2)\).

3. **Verifying:** on input a public key \((p, q, g_1, g_2, t, v)\), a message \( m \), and signature \((e, y_1, y_2)\), compute \( x := g_1^{y_1} \cdot g_2^{y_2} \cdot v^e \mod p \). The verification checks whether
\[
H(x, m) \overset{?}{=} e
\]